

NOTES OF MEETING WITH MR TINUS JACOBS

S.A.A. OFFICES, TAIPEI

Saturday, 23 July 1988

S.A.A.: ZS-SAS
0302-1908

Mr Adriaan Malherbe → SNR *CHIEF LEGAL ADVISOR* →
 Mr Robin Davidson → *TECHNICAL OFFICER*
 Mr Cedric Puckrin → *SAA lawyer @ Margo Enquiry*
 Mr Peter de Wet →
 Mr Tinus Jacobs
 Mr Joseph Chan → *PASSENGER - SALES MNG*
 NMH

INTRODUCTION

- 1 The meeting was held for Tinus to brief us regarding departure of the Helderberg from Chang Kai Shek Airport (CKS) at Taipei on 27th November 1987.

SUMMARY

- 2 The flight departure was unusually delayed by fog for 1 hour, 10 minutes but otherwise was routine. Tinus has not subsequently been alerted to any circumstances that have changed this view. No threats as to the safety/security of the flight.

DESPATCH

3 Joseph and I attended to the despatch of The Helderberg on 27th November. This was unusual, because when two flights per week incepted on 1st November 1987, we had decided that we each despatch one flight per week. There were booked aboard 153 persons configured as to 8F, 26C and 118Y to be handled by 19 crew members. In fact, 140 passenger configured as to 8F, 20C and 112Y, 1 infant and 19 crew were aboard. Therefore, thirteen passengers did not travel as booked.

4 Unusually that evening, CKS Airport was temporarily fog-bound and a number of flights inbound to TPE had to be diverted to Kaohsiung in the south of Taiwan, to include three CX flights from TYO, SEL and HKG, which had aboard 52 passengers that were to connect with flight SA 295. Joseph and I advised the China Airlines operations room and secured the agreement of Captain Uys to a departure time delay of up to 2hrs., being within permitted crew duty time allowances. Consequently, I decided that these passengers would connect with SA 295 if CX were able to depart from Kaohsiung on or before 21.00hrs. LT.

5 In order to avoid possible problems with the telephone as CKS I asked my wife to telephone from our home to JNB "operations" to ensure that there would be no ongoing problems if ZS-SAS arrived 2hrs. behind schedule, which subsequently they were able to confirm there would not

WHY WOULD MRS JACOBS PHONE JAY SMUTS (NOT EMPLOYED BY SAM ONLY ASSIST HUSBAND NEARBY SOCIAL ACTIVITY) be.
 MOST IRREGULAR

6 At 20,45hrs, a passenger announcement was made at the departure gate at TPE as to the reasons for the delay and that we would hope to commence passenger boarding at 21.30hrs. This was accepted by the passengers. I asked CX, by telex, to let me have the names of the connecting passengers and they responded.

7 Flight CX 451 with 47 passengers aboard, landed at 21.21. According to arrangements previously agreed with Captain Oys, I arranged for there to be an airside transfer of the connecting baggage: viz the CX containers were taken across to our aircraft and baggage was then transferred into S.A.A. containers and loaded aboard the lower deck. The baggage was transferred by TIASCO. There was no security or other check on that baggage supplementary to that presumably carried out at origin station.

8 At 21.30 we commenced boarding of all passengers. TPE originating passengers boarded first, and then the ex-CX passengers who, by prior arrangement with China Airlines, had already been assigned seats: boarding cards were issued to them at the departure gate. In the course of passenger boarding we discovered four connecting passengers ex-TYO who identities had not been advised to us by CX in their earlier telex: arrangements were made for these passengers to board the aircraft. At that stage, transit passengers did not go through a security check. Subsequently, they do.

Brian says
JAMES TOO THROUGH
TO CM IT NAMES

9 CARGO

- DO NOT INDICATE
CHECKED BAGGAGE
WEIGHT (FOR SUITCASES)*
- (a) As appears from the attached loadsheet there was 31,549kgs. of cargo and a further 11,676kgs. of estimated passenger weight and cabin baggage. With regarding to TPE originating cargo, please refer to meeting with cargo agents of this morning. (See Annexure TJ1 hereto). Refer also to the commentary on the shippers letter of instruction, Annexure TJ2.
- (b) With regard to non TYO originating cargo, connecting with flight SA295, two pallets were received from TYO ready built up and covered. These were loaded without checks additional to any of CX. There was also some loose ex-TYO cargo that was built into pallets by TIASCO. Ordinarily with transfer cargo received on or prior to 4-3hrs. before departure, such cargo is offloaded from the incoming aircraft and towed by TIASCO to the cargo transfer warehouse and subsequently retrieved by them and taken to the TACT warehouse as soon as our agents, China Airlines, have completed the loading sheets.
- (c) In regard to cargo loading and handling, refer to the notes of meetings on 25 July 1988 and 26 July 1988, annexures TJ3 and TJ4 hereto.

10 AIRPORT SECURITY

- (a) Historically, security was not thought to be a problem at TPE. Before I took up my duties here I was briefed by the S.A.A. security department at JNB who told me that TPE was one of the "safest" airline stations in the world. On arrival, my impressions were borne out. In June 1987, Mr ^{DEPUTY TO JAPAN PIK.} Peter Prinsloo, our Security Director, visited us and advised me that he was aware of no security problem either at CKS or, with the exception of MNL, at the other airports, (being SIN, BKH, HKG, SEL and TYO) feeding passengers/cargo into TPE for S.A.A. MNL was not, in practice, a problem because we rarely carry Phillipinos; our evening departure times and the visa problems for them in TPE make for a long connecting wait at the TPE airport and therefore carriage by SAA from TPE is unattractive as compared with routes out of HKG.
- (b) The internal security in TPE by the Bureau of Investigation, the system of civilian informants, the severity of punishments for crime and the mentality of the people generally all make it improbable to me that a person of R.O.C. nationality would seek to put some sort of device aboard the Helderberg. There is limited overseas dissent to the R.O.C. government and, in any event, I query why S.A.A. should be the chosen focus for such dissent.

- (c) Security at the airport, until July 1987, was under the control of garrison command pursuant to then existing martial law. The police then took over and were handling matters at the time of departure of Helderberg. Armed police were ^{not counting to them being there} or should have been (according to the usual practice) stationed on the apron adjacent to the aircraft throughout the turn-around time. In-house security at TACT was also apparently tight in that operations are carried on under video camera surveillance (but we have not been able to obtain any tapes) and under the watchful eye of uniformed and plain clothes security men. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that, with the huge volumes of cargo involved (TPE handled 55 freighter aircraft a week) then subject to (a) above, it would be possible for someone (with a permit) to slip something into a cargo pallet. Those familiar with the operation of the aircraft, and the identity of S.A.A. pallets, aside from the parties to the AWB's, would know that a particular cargo was to be carried by S.A.A.
- (d) Access airside is given only to persons holding a permit of the designated category. It is my experience (involving a wait of eight months) that such permits are not lightly issued, at least to expatriates and that R.O.C. nationals would do all they can to prevent themselves inadvertently compromising their standing with the government in case their permit was lost. Nevertheless, once a permit is issued there is no day to day check upon any permit holder as to what he may be carrying upon his person, aside from the general surveillance referred to above. This applies equally to

cargo handlers, refuellers, aircraft cleaners and all those other persons, to include the staff of S.A.A. and other air carriers, concerned in and about the airside area. Nevertheless, I do not consider it necessary to suspect those persons because the logical conclusion would be to stop flying.

- (e) Regarding security in general, refer also to the notes of the meeting at CKS airport on 26 July 1988 (Annexure TJ5 hereto).

SMOKE DETECTOR

11 Two weeks perior to Helderberg flight, on Friday 13th November, I travelled on the same aircraft to South Africa, returning only on Tuesday, 25th November to TPE. On the outbound leg we had a technical delay. Whilst seated in the Club Class section two Ground engineers and the Flight Engineer passed me and I joined them on the way to the cargo compartment. They said the smoke detectors did not work. I remember the engineers looking down onto the floor of the main deck cargo compartment (between the restraining netting and the cargo door) and hearing the engineer say "No, let's go" or "Now, let's go". They had not been there for more than three minutes and did not return to that area before we took off. I do not know whether this was their first visit to the area concerned and I cannot say what they attended to. I can say no more on this aspect.

DANGEROUS GOODS

- 12 During July 1989, Joseph and I went through the dangerous goods section at the airport. There is a separate strongroom kept locked in the airport section as indicated on the plan of the cargo warehouse attached hereto (Annexure TJ6). This section is constantly guarded by a guard.

STATEMENT TO DCA

- 13 I made a statement to Mr Jordaan of the DCA on 25 April 1989, copy attached marked TJ7. In regard to the last paragraph on the first page and first paragraph on the second page, I understood "military cargo" to mean arms and ammunition.

BICYCLES

- 14 I was aware that Captain Uys was conveying a bicycle (or bicycles) on the aircraft. This was stored in hold 5, lower cargo hold.

EDWIN CORPORATION

- 15 Some weeks ago, I received a request from the DCA to investigate a consignment from Edwin Corp. to Maruimpex (Pty) Limited. I attach hereto, marked TJ8 a copy of my

report on investigations in Taiwan addressed to Mr N. Hughes. (A copy thereof has been given to the DCA).

REVISED AND UPDATED

JAN SMUTS AIRPORT

27 July 1989