

Cargo Manifest

There is a miscalculation regarding the number of packages. The total on this page is not 1.168 packages but should be 1.176, i.e. eight packages more. Because the calculation was done on a not so clear copy, and not on the original paper, the entry under AWB 297-4011 9306 was read as 100 packages and not 108. Just enlarge the doc, and it becomes clear. Obviously, manual entries were, at least to some extent, done later, and not at the point / time of origin.

		<u>REVENUE CARGO</u>	(KGS)		
297-4011 9327 ✓	3 ✓	MONITOR/CONSOL ✓	47 ✓	MM ✓	251107 ✓
4011 9316	1	VEGETABLE SEED	95	BLW	241154
4011 4830 ✓	102 ✓	CONSOL. SHPT ✓	1292 ✓		241025 E+ ✓
4011 9306 ✓	103 ✓	CONSOL. SHPT ✓	916 ✓		261655 D00011 X EMPTY BOX 35Pcs
4010 3991 ✓	124 ✓	CONSOL. SHPT ✓	2404 ✓		261627 E+ X 2
4008 8425 ✓	1 ✓	FABRIC ✓	2 ✓	DUR ✓	26 1414 ✓
4011 4863 ✓	1 ✓	MEN'S SHIRTS ✓	5 ✓	DUB ✓	261552 ✓
4005 5993 ✓	101 ✓	CONSOL SHPTS. ✓	968 ✓		261615 D00011
4011 4852 ✓	415 ✓	CONSOL SHPTS. ✓	5772 ✓		261710 E+ X 3
4014 7025 ✓	290 ✓	CONSOL SHPTS. ✓	4844 ✓		261556 D+ X 3
4015 1893 ✓	1 ✓	DIPLOMATIC MAIL ✓	3 ✓	MM ✓	271352 DV15
4011 9343 ✓	1 ✓	PRINTER CONVERTER ✓	3 ✓		271423 ✓
C 3057 1772 ✓	29 ✓	BAGS ✓	265 ✓	MM:267.5	261634 D00011
	<u>1168</u> ✓		<u>16521</u> ✓		

Flight path

The idea put forward in Unknown2.pdf (don't know at the moment where I got this from, but you will probably recognise the paper), contradicts the path as outlined on the sketch by T.A.

Looking at that sketch you will note that, the a/c passed along the Eastern shores of Taiwan to the Southern tip, point HCN. Point ELATO, however, is about halfway between HCN and HongKong, and there is no route southward from that point. Also, flying directly from ELATO to point DUNAR, etc would have taken the a/c as close as 80 nm from the centre of typhoon Nina, not exactly a smart thing to do, whereas following route N892 would have doubled that distance. (see sea firs.gif / NINA ZSSAS PATH.gif). This also follows more or less the route of T.A. 's sketch.

Pls note that, the sea firs map is as of now, and over the past 20 years changes have certainly been done, but these concern mostly the introduction of additional routes and reassignment of FIRs in connection with opening up the air space of Cambodia and VietNam

The main NE – SW routes connecting certain places will have remained largely unchanged.

Following the route marked red lines/yellow points, will lead to route A327 (BEDAX), which connects to route UA327F (KALBI / MRU FIR boundary).

Regarding the flight path, following speculation:

To bring the a/c down and have it disappear, a small simple explosive device to destroy the rear pressure bulkhead would have done the job. With the right timing, the accident could have been blamed on bad weather (Typhoon Nina), surface SAR ops in Vietnamese claimed waters (EEZ) would have been possible, but poking around on the ocean floor would have been impossible for political reasons for many years to come. (I worked in that area during 1988, to obtain permits was like walking through diplomatic mine fields).

Further, there are suitably located areas in the South China Sea with depth of some 5.000 m and more (the USN has detailed maps of the ocean floor in that area).

Since this did not happen, and nobody so far has claimed responsibility or made a political statement in connection to the a/c accident, the idea was, to force the plane to land, if possible in a far off place. Suitable would be either DG or MRU, which are just over two hours flying time apart. The government of MRU could have been easily persuaded by superior powers to play along.

Tragically, someone miscalculated or forgot to factor in the effects of the typhoon re. speed. (Btw, TAS-true air speed is defined as the a/c's speed through the surrounding air mass. If this air mass is moving, then the TAS is not the true speed over ground). Also, to destroy the plane would have served no purpose, but to get hold of the plane, obtain some info, and probably keep a pax or two behind for questioning makes more sense to me.